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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOHNNY MEDINA DURAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900022-CA 
Priority No. 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Fairness requires a decision on the merits in this case. 
This conditional appeal is not interlocutory. The State's 
argument that this Court has no jurisdiction over this case because 
it is an interlocutory appeal is incorrect. This case involves a 
conditional appeal, which under State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), is not considered interlocutory. 
The plea was conditional. As the record in the trial court 
bears out, Mr. Duran pled guilty to the distribution charges because 
he believed that, if he is successful in reversing the trial court's 
denial of his motion to dismiss the habitual criminal charge, he 
will return to stand trial on the distribution charges without 
risking a life sentence under the improperly charged habitual 
criminal statute. 
After Mr. Duran's counsel articulated the prosecutor's 
understanding of the conditional nature of the plea, the prosecutor 
said nothing. The State is too late now to contest the conditional 
nature of Mr. Duran's plea. 
Although the trial court expressed some doubt as to whether 
this Court would hear an appeal relating to the dismissed habitual 
criminal charge, the trial court heard Mr. Duran's understanding of 
the plea and accepted Mr. Duran's plea. 
This appeal is not moot and was not waived. The mootness 
doctrine, requiring a litigant to be affected by judicial 
determinations, does not bar Mr. Duran's appeal because his plea was 
conditional. The conditional nature of the plea also vitiates the 
State's waiver arguments. 
The threat of the life sentence posed by the habitual 
criminal conviction induced Mr. Duran to plead guilty to 
distribution of controlled substances. The dismissal of the 
habitual criminal charge after Mr. Duran pled guilty does not 
dissipate the coercive and injurious impact of the habitual criminal 
charge. If the conditional plea understood by Mr. Duran is honored, 
as it should be, and he is eventually allowed to defend against the 
distribution charges without the threat of the life sentence posed 
by the habitual criminal charge, his rights will be affected by this 
appeal. 
In the event that this Court needs to reach the question, 
this Court should reject the State's argument that conditional 
appeals are permitted only in cases where the issues on appeal are 
"dispositive." Such a rule is inconsistent with Utah's 
constitutional rights to appeal, and with the history of conditional 
appeals in Utah. The dispositive conditional appeal rule is not 
applied strictly in jurisdictions that have adopted the rule, and 
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the policy reasons behind the dispositive conditional appeal rule do 
not call for its application under the facts of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THIS APPEAL. 
The State repeatedly characterizes this appeal as 
interlocutory, and argues that under Utah Code Ann. section 77-18a-l 
(Supp. 1990) and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(e), this Court 
may dismiss this appeal for want of appropriate procedure invoking 
this Court's interlocutory appeal jurisdiction. Appellee's brief 
at 1 and n.l, 2, and 9. 
While Mr. Duran unsuccessfully sought leave of the trial 
court for interlocutory review of the trial court's failure to 
dismiss the habitual criminal charge (T.2 11-13)# that motion for an 
interlocutory appeal does not transform this appeal into an 
interlocutory appeal. 
If the State is arguing that conditional appeals are 
interlocutory and must follow the procedural rules for interlocutory 
appeals, the State is incorrect. In State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), this Court explained as follows: 
It is true that a conditional plea reserving 
a suppression issue for appeal does not have the 
complete finality of an unconditioned plea, but 
it still results in a judgment of conviction, not 
an interlocutory order. That judgment is as 
final as any conviction after trial that might be 
reversed on direct appeal. 
Id. at 939. 
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This Court's jurisdiction over this appeal is provided by 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f), which grants appellate 
jurisdiction over "appeals from district court in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital 
felony."1 
II. 
THE PLEA WAS CONDITIONAL. 
The State contends that the record in this case reflects an 
unconditional plea, stating, "The remarks of the trial court and 
counsel in connection with the plea bargain clearly show that the 
State, and more especially the trial court neither agreed nor 
accepted a conditional plea, if. in fact, the State actually offered 
such." Appellee's brief at 6 (emphasis added). Such statements 
must be evaluated with care.2 
1. Appellate counsel for Mr. Duran, Elizabeth Holbrook, 
erroneously indicated in the initial Statement of Jurisdiction that 
this Court's jurisdiction is provided by "Utah Code Ann. section 
76-2a-3(2)(e) (jurisdiction over criminal convictions less than 
first degree felonies)." Appellant's brief at 1. Subsection (e) 
refers to interlocutory appeals, while subsection (f) refers to 
jurisdiction over criminal convictions less than first degree 
felonies, and should have been cited. Counsel for Mr. Duran has 
made the same error in numerous other appeals from final orders, 
e.g. State v. Kendall Northern. Case No. 900565-CA, and regrets any 
contribution this may have had in the State's incorrect 
jurisdictional argument in this case. 
2. To the knowledge of Mr. Duran's appellate counsel, the 
attorney general and the trial prosecutor currently both maintain 
that the plea in this case was unconditional. Mr. Duran, his trial 
counsel, Mary Corporon, and his appellate counsel maintain that the 
plea in this case was conditional. 
See State v. Mclntire. 93 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah Ct. App. 
(footnote continues) 
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In the trial court, Mr. Duran's trial counsel clearly 
articulated the understanding of the prosecutor that the plea was 
conditional, "Your Honor, I also wanted to indicate for the record, 
one final aspect of the agreement I had with counsel, and I believe 
she understood I would be specifically reserving on the record the 
issue of our Motion to Dismiss Count 3 of the Information and the 
legal issues raised regarding the habitual criminal statute, and it 
will be my intention to reserve those for appellate review." 
(T.2 65-66) (emphasis added). 
The prosecutor did not dispute defense counsel's 
characterization of the prosecutor's understanding of the 
conditional nature of the plea. Id. 
The State should be bound by the record as it stands, 
establishing that the prosecutor and Mr. Duran intended the plea to 
be conditioned on his right to appeal the habitual criminal statute 
issues. See State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1274 (Utah 
1988)(defense counsel characterized plea agreement between defense 
(footnote 2 continued) 
Oct. 17, 1988)(defense counsel stated at oral argument that plea was 
unconditional); State v. Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970, 971 and n.2 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989)(defense counsel established on rehearing that plea 
was conditional); State v. Bobo, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 25-26 and 
n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(relying on assertion of assistant attorney 
general, this Court found that plea was unconditional); State v. 
Bobo, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 67, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(relying on 
subsequent affidavit of trial court submitted by defense counsel on 
rehearing, this Court found that plea was conditional); State v. 
Geer, 765 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 
(Utah 1989)(this Court rejected Stated claim that appeal was waived 
by entry of conditional guilty plea); State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 
937 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(prosecutor assented to conditional plea on 
record in trial court; on appeal, State contended that conditional 
plea was improper and mistaken). 
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and State; counsel for the State did not object; "creating the 
inference" that defense counsel's characterization of the bargain 
was correct); State v. Kav, 717 P.2d 1294, 1306 (Utah 1986)(if State 
disagrees with proposed plea agreement, State should object). 
While the trial court disputed whether this Court would 
hear an appeal on the issues involved in the habitual criminal count 
because that count has been dismissed (see discussion in Point II, 
establishing that the mootness concerns expressed by the trial court 
are not applicable in the context of this conditional plea), the 
court first heard Mr. Duran's understanding of the conditional 
nature of the plea, and then accepted the plea. The court stated, 
They have been dismissed. . . . They will never 
hear it. The State has dismissed it, but you can 
make a record on that, if you want. . . . You 
have a right to do what you want, but if it is 
dismissed there is nothing to appeal there is no 
issue. . . . If there is anything to appeal, and 
I don't know if Mr. Duran would want vou to 
appeal it. What if you lost? . . . You don't 
need to say anything, Mr. Duran. That is on the 
record. Whatever you do, you do. Since it is 
dismissed, there is not that issue facing 
Mr. Duran or the issue before the Court. 
(T.2 66) (emphasis added). 
While Mr. Duran's counsel acknowledged the trial court's 
concerns about whether this Court would hear the appeal, nothing in 
the record contradicts Mr. Duran's, trial counsel's, and the 
prosecutor's understanding that the plea was conditional. The trial 
court allowed this record to be created, and accepted the plea. 
If, as the State contends, the trial court did not accept 
the conditional plea, the trial court would have called upon 
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Mr. Duran to withdraw the plea. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
11(8)(b) and (c) (1990) provide, 
(b) When a tentative plea agreement has been 
reached that contemplates entry of a plea in the 
expectation that other charges will be dropped or 
dismissed the judge, upon request of the parties, 
may permit the disclosure to him of the tentative 
agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of 
the time for tender of the plea. The judge may 
then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and 
defense counsel whether he will approve the 
proposed disposition. 
(c) If the judge then decides that final 
disposition should not be in conformity with the 
plea agreement, he shall advise the defendant and 
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or 
withdraw his plea. 
The trial court's acceptance of Mr. Duran's maintained 
intent to appeal the habitual criminal issues, and refraining from 
calling on Mr. Duran to withdraw the plea demonstrate that the trial 
court accepted the conditional plea. 
If this Court were not in agreement that the record 
establishes that the plea was conditional, this Court presumably 
could remand this case for a hearing on the conditional nature of 
the plea. Particularly because the October 17, 1989, hearing in 
this case preceded this Court's decision in State v. Bobo, 131 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah Ct. App. March 19, 1990)(clarifying the 
requirement to make an explicit record of the conditional plea), 
this Court should act in the interest of judicial economy and decide 
the merits of the habitual criminal issues raised by Mr. Duran. See 
People v. O'Neal. 421 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Mich. App. 1988)(court 
decided merits in interest of judicial economy, rather than 
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remanding to lower court on issue of conditional nature of the 
plea); State v. Moore. 577 A.2d 348, 349 (Me. 1990)(same). 
III. 
THE APPEAL IS NOT MOOT AND WAS NOT WAIVED. 
The State contends that Mr. Duran's appeal of the habitual 
criminal charge is moot because the habitual charge was dismissed in 
the plea bargain—he received "precisely the relief that [he] sought 
when he first moved to have that charge dismissed." Appellee's 
brief at 7. 
Mr. Duran did not receive precisely the same benefit in 
having the habitual criminal charge dismissed after he pled guilty 
to the distribution charges. If the trial court had dismissed the 
habitual criminal charge prior to trial, Mr. Duran could have 
defended against the distribution charges without risking the life 
sentence attendant to the habitual criminal conviction. Mr. Duran 
is currently serving a sentence in the Utah State Prison for the 
distribution convictions, which convictions he intends a jury to 
determine in the event that this Court agrees that the habitual 
criminal count was improperly charged in this case. Mr. Duran7s 
undefended distribution convictions are a continuing injury to 
Mr. Duran. 
If this Court allows Mr. Duran7s conditional plea to be 
honored and agrees that the habitual criminal charge is not proper 
in this case, this Court will "affect the rights" of Mr. Duran by 
allowing him to defend against the distribution charges. The 
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State's mootness argument, thus, does not apply to Mr. Duran's 
conditional plea. See Burkett v. Schwendiman. 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 
1989)(mootness doctrine is a discretionary doctrine used when 
appellate decisions would not affect the rights of the litigants). 
As shown by State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), Mr. Duran's reliance on conditional nature of the plea is 
further reason to reject the discretionary mootness doctrine in this 
case. In Tebbs, the defendant entered a conditional no contest plea 
to two counts of communications fraud, reserving the right to 
challenge the constitutionality of the communications fraud 
statute. Id. at 776-777. Prior to addressing the merits of the 
issue, this Court voiced skepticism that the defendant had standing 
to challenge the statute, because his argument was based on the 
statute's placing the burden of proof on the defendant, and he did 
not make any effort to meet that burden of proof in the trial 
court. Id. at 777. After explaining this Court's concerns about 
the defendant's standing, this Court decided to reach the merits of 
the issue, explaining in footnote 4: 
Our decision to reach the merits is prompted 
by the likelihood that defendant's perceived 
ability to pursue the issue on appeal was 
critical to his decision to enter a no-contest 
plea, which also probably explains why the state 
chose not to raise the standing issue. 
While the standing doctrine of Tebbs differs from the 
mootness doctrines in this case, both doctrines are discretionary. 
While the State did not raise the standing issue in Tebbs, but 
raises the mootness doctrine in this case, Mr. Duran, like 
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Mr. Tebbs, relied on the understanding that he could have an appeal 
on the merits in entering the conditional plea. If the mootness 
doctrine could properly apply in this case, this Court should follow 
Tebbs and exercise its discretion to reach the merits of the case. 
The State's closely related waiver argument, Appellee/s 
brief at 8-12, is also inapposite because Mr. Duran's plea was 
conditional. The State argues that "A voluntary guilty plea is a 
waiver of the right to appeal all non-jurisdictional issues." 
Appellee's brief at 8. While this axiom is correct, it does not 
apply to cases involving conditional pleas. State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 
935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Even if the waiver doctrine did 
apply in the context of conditional pleas, because the State could 
not have proceeded properly against Mr. Duran with the unsupportable 
habitual criminal charge, the issue is like a jurisdictional issue 
and cannot be waived. £f. People v. Reid, 362 N.W.2d 655, 659 
(Mich. 1984)(extending jurisdiction exemption of waiver doctrine to 
include defects which do not relate to guilt or innocence, but 
indicate that there should not have been a prosecution); id. at 663 
(Ryan, J., dissenting)(discussing case law to the same effect). 
IV. 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT APPLY OR ADOPT 
A "DISPOSITIVE ISSUE" CONDITIONAL APPEAL RULE. 
The State contends that Mr. Duran's conditional appeal 
should not be heard because a decision on the merits would not be 
dispositive of the case. Appellee's brief at 12-14. A dispositive 
issue rule would be inconsistent with the right to appeal protected 
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by the Utah Constitution, and with traditional appellate practice in 
this state. 
The right to appeal is guaranteed not once, but twice, by 
the Utah Constitution. Article I section 12 provides, in part, "In 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to appeal 
in all cases." Article VIII section 5 provides, in part, "Except 
for matters filed originally with the supreme court, there shall be 
in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original 
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the 
cause." These constitutional provisions speak in absolute terms, 
and limiting appeals to "dispositive" issues would contravene these 
constitutional provisions. 
A "dispositive issue" rule would also be inconsistent with 
appellate procedure in Utah. While this Court has set forth 
explicit standards on the entry of conditional pleas, e.g. State v. 
Bobo, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), counsel for 
Mr. Duran is unable to find one conditional plea case from this 
Court or from the Utah Supreme Court applying a "dispositive issue" 
rule. While Sery does refer to other authorities applying a 
"dispositive issue" rule, State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938-939 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988), there is nothing in Sery indicating that the issue 
decided on the merits by this Court was dispositive. See Sery. 758 
P.2d at 947 ("The order of the trial court denying defendant's 
suppression motion is reversed, and the case is remanded to the 
district court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion."). In Utah, even traditional appeals from final orders are 
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frequently not dispositive. See e.g. State v. Sampson, 143 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(reversing conviction and remanding 
for possible retrial); State v. Sampson. 154 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991)(recognizing district court's jurisdiction to release 
Mr. Sampson pending further proceedings on appeal); State v. 
Sampsonr 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)(supplementing 
initial opinion, maintaining the need for remand for possible 
retrial). 
The policy reasons for a "dispositive issue" rule do not 
call for its adoption in this case. In Everett v. State, 535 So.2d 
667 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1988), the court explained the purposes 
behind its "dispositive issue" rule: 
First it enhances the likelihood that a meritless 
appeal will not be pursued, and second, it 
pretermits the potentially misleading formation 
of a belief in the defendant that relief from the 
judgment and sentence can be achieved in the 
appellate court. Moreover, and as a corollary to 
the foregoing, it would insure a timely 
opportunity for the defendant to evaluate 
withdrawal from the plea agreement. 
Id. at 669. 
While these policy reasons may be legitimate, in Utah, 
criminal defendants are represented by attorneys at trial and on 
appeal. Attorneys are able and ethically obligated to serve the 
policy reasons underlying the dispositive issue rule. There is no 
need for the rule. 
The policy reasons behind the "dispositive issue" rule 
would not be impacted adversely by this Court's decision on the 
merits in this case. Mr. Duran's appeal is not meritless. 
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Mr. Duran wants the opportunity to defend against the distribution 
charges, and is not under any impression that success on this appeal 
will automatically obviate the distribution charges. Mr. Duran does 
not want to withdraw from the conditional plea agreement he made 
with the prosecutor. 
If this Court were to adopt a "dispositive issue rule," it 
should not be applied in this case because Mr. Duran had no notice 
of such a requirement. See Wright v. State. 547 So.2d 258, 260 
(Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1989)(dispositive issue rule applied only in 
cases following decision putting defendants on notice of the rule). 
Even if a "dispositive issue" rule were published in this 
jurisdiction prior to the hearing in this case, judicial economy 
would call for a decision on the merits. See Harrison v. State, 791 
P.2d 359, 360 n.l (Alaska App. 1990)(court addressed the merits of 
the issue despite the fact that the dispositive issue rule was not 
met in order to conserve the parties' resources). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reach the merits of this case. 
Respectfully submitted this 'fs j^^day of April, 
1991. 
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